“We Are in This Together”: Common Group Identity Predicts Majority Members’ Active Acculturation Efforts to Integrate Immigrants

Jonas R. Kunst1,2,3, Lotte Thomsen1,2,3, David L. Sam4, and John W. Berry5,6

Abstract
Although integration involves a process of mutual accommodation, the role of majority groups is often downplayed to passive tolerance, leaving immigrants with the sole responsibility for active integration. However, we show that common group identity can actively involve majority members in this process across five studies. Study 1 showed that common identity positively predicted support of integration efforts; Studies 2 and 3 extended these findings, showing that it also predicted real behavior such as monetary donations and volunteering. A decrease in modern racism mediated the relations across these studies, and Studies 4 and 5 further demonstrated that it indeed mediated these effects over and above acculturation expectations and color-blindness, which somewhat compromised integration efforts. Moreover, the last two studies also demonstrated that common, but not dual, groups motivated integration efforts. Common identity appears crucial for securing majorities’ altruistic efforts to integrate immigrants and, thus, for achieving functional multiculturalism.

Keywords
common group identity, acculturation, integration, dual identity, modern racism

Received March 21, 2014; revision accepted July 16, 2015

The world is experiencing an era of immigration, possibly still in its infancy. During the last four decades, the number of people living outside their birth country has more than doubled worldwide (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2005) to a number higher “than at any time in history” (United Nations, 2006, p. 1). As immigration-receiving countries in all parts of the world are becoming increasingly multicultural, the successful societal integration of immigrants is arguably one of the most pressing social issues globally.

Large amounts of research show that integration is the most adaptive acculturation strategy for immigrants finding themselves in a new society (see Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2012; Sam & Berry, 2006, for reviews). Following Berry’s (1974, 1980) acculturation framework, immigrants differ in their heritage culture maintenance and their participation in the larger majority society. Here, integration occurs when immigrants maintain their heritage culture while also engaging in the larger culture.

Still, integration is not a state confined to immigrants’ self-concepts. Although most psychological research has focused on integration as acculturation strategy, integration also clearly denotes a socio-structural state and outcome.

Indeed, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD; 2012) assesses immigrants’ integration through socio-economic indicators such as income, housing, education, and labor-market participation. Nor does the integration of immigrants operate in a social vacuum. Although public discourse tends to attribute unsuccessful integration to immigrants’ reluctance to integrate (Triandafyllidou, 2000) with little, if any, focus on the responsibility of majority groups (Vasta, 2007), integration is achieved through mutual accommodation (Berry, 1974, 1997; IOM, 2012). Such mutual accommodation requires immigrants’ willingness to integrate and majority members’ active work toward
achieved a society where all cultural groups are equally integrated (see Horenczyk, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Sam, & Vedder, 2013, for a discussion). Hence, when referring to integration in this article, we do not simply mean the acculturation strategy of integration, but conceptualize successful integration as the state where immigrants occupy socio-economic positions comparable with those of majority members (Hum & Simpson, 2004; Kurthen & Heisler, 2008). Crucially, we argue that this state cannot be reached solely through immigrants’ own endeavors, but requires majority members’ active support (Phelps, Eilertsen, Türken, & Ommundsen, 2011).

Here, majority efforts at the grass-root likely play an important role. When moving to another country, immigrants are confronted with various challenges including learning a new language and understanding different cultural environments (Masgoret & Ward, 2006). Moreover, immigrants tend to have low socio-economic status (Stalker, 2001) and often face stressful periods of financial insecurity on arrival (Stewart et al., 2008). Especially in this early phase of integration, immigrants profit from support provided by the majority society (Stewart et al., 2008), for instance, in form of language courses (Christensen & Stanat, 2007) or labor-market training (Garcia-Ramirez et al., 2005), which, however, seldom are provided as official integration programs. Hence, majority members’ solidarity integration efforts may make a crucial difference.

Nevertheless, most acculturation research on majority groups so far has focused on attitudes only, reducing majority members’ responsibility to passive tolerance (Phelps et al., 2011). For instance, majority factors such as prejudice (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006) and acculturation expectations (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Horenczyk, & Schmitz, 2003) have been highlighted as determinants of immigrants’ integration. Even full-fledged and frequently used models of acculturation such as the Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997) pay virtually no attention to the behavioral involvement and responsibility of the majority population.

Certainly, achieving tolerance is one important goal in multicultural societies—particularly, given the negative relationship between stigma and minority health (see Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009, for a meta-review). However, a disproportionate focus on achieving tolerance may blur, rather than address, socio-economic inequalities between majority members and immigrants that are detrimental to integration (Banerjee & Linstead, 2001; Haylett, 2001). Put bluntly, the guise of tolerance, immigrants usually hold significantly lower socio-economic positions than majority members, which can be observed even in the most vibrant examples of multiculturalism such as Canada (Galabuzi, 2004; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). Insofar as tolerance merely reflects “a neutral (passive) midpoint between prejudicial attitudes on the one hand, and positive attitudes entailing a willingness to proactively include immigrant out-groups on the other” (Phelps et al., 2011, p. 404), it may leave the socio-structural integration of immigrants unattended. Thus, as majority members’ passive acceptance of immigrants appears insufficient to achieve their integration (defined as the equitable societal participation of all ethno-cultural groups; Berry & Sam, 2013, 2014; Fleras, 2009), a truly multicultural society should be characterized by actual majority efforts toward integration.

However, the transformation from an ethno-culturally homogeneous to a multicultural society that results from immigration often challenges the boundaries of majority members’ national identity concepts (Uberoi, 2008). Consequently, the inclusiveness or permeability of their identity—a factor central to, but seldom investigated in, the context of acculturation—should play a crucial role in motivating such integration efforts. We suggest that superordinate common group identity involving both majorities and minorities likely is a key factor for majority integration efforts.

The Common In-Group Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) builds on the notion that if the members of a group also identify with a common, superordinate group including both the in- and out-groups, it will reduce intergroup bias because in-group favoritism generalizes to the (embedded) out-group. Indeed, majority members holding national identities that encapsulate both the in-group (e.g., American citizens) and the out-group (e.g., immigrants) tend to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than those with more narrowly defined identity concepts do (Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, 2003; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Dovidio, Semenya, & Jackson, 2005).

However, research indicates that common group identities may not only improve out-group attitudes but also lead to more favorable behavior toward out-groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2009; Dovidio et al., 1997; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). For instance, common group identity predicted football fans’ willingness to help each other across team affiliations (Levine et al., 2005), and students’ willingness to help a fellow student in need (Dovidio et al., 1997). This suggests that majority members with a high common group identity that “makes room” for immigrants in the in-group will also be more interested in helping them to obtain an equitable socio-economic position in society.

The present research tests whether it is indeed the case that common group identification increases majority group members’ willingness to not only advocate for but also actively contribute to the integration of immigrants through real behavioral efforts (Hypothesis 1). We expect a decrease in the out-group bias that common groups are known to cause (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to at least partly mediate this relationship (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, we expect that the effects of common group identity on majorities’ efforts to integrate immigrants would be mediated by a decrease in modern racism, because it explicitly taps attitudes toward the sharing of resources with minorities (Sears & Henry, 2005).
that the successful, socio-economic integration of immigrants entails: The modern racism construct traditionally was used to measure the belief that African Americans have “gotten more economically than they deserve.” “push themselves where they are not wanted” and “are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights” (McConahay, 1986, p. 108). Hence, modern racists believe that African Americans should solve their problems on their own without assistance. In recent research, the construct has been extended to various immigrant settings (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000; Pettigrew et al., 1997), and here, strongly predicts attitudes toward resource distribution such as affirmative action, school integration, and welfare programs (Sears & Henry, 2005). This suggests that modern racism should also decrease majority members’ willingness to support and facilitate the integration of immigrants. However, shared group membership is well-known to promote a generalized norm of ingroup sharing (Brewer, 2008; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Consequently, common group identities that precisely involve shared group membership between majority members and immigrants should effectively counter such resource-distribution bias and thereby indirectly lead to more integration efforts.

We also hypothesize that dual group identities should be less effective in promoting such integration efforts (Hypothesis 3). Majority members are known for preferring common group identities over dual identities because a common identity practically assimilates the minority, making them conform to the majority group that typically holds primacy of definition over the common group (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2012; Hehman et al., 2012). Dual groups, in contrast, involve that the minority–majority sub-group distinction is maintained within an overarching common group. Such a scenario should be less effective in offsetting modern racism because the group divisions along which resources are distributed remain intact. Hence, here a generalized norm of resource sharing should not apply to immigrant out-group members.

Consequently, we expected the common identity question of “who belongs to us” to feed particularly strongly into support for integrating Muslim immigrants. Moreover, we predicted that modern racism to large extent would underlie this relation as it explicitly taps resource-distribution bias, which in past research has robustly predicted majority members' support of minority members with low socio-economic status (Sears & Henry, 2005).

Method

Participants. In all, 182 native Norwegian participants were recruited for an online survey through social networks in August, 2012 (M_{age} = 30.42, SD_{age} = 9.58; females: 54.9%).

Procedure and materials. Participants completed the following measures on 6-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree) unless stated otherwise:

Independent variable. Common group identification was measured with two items: “Despite cultural differences, Norwegians and Muslim immigrants represent one and the same group” and “Norwegians and Muslim immigrants represent two different groups” (reversed-coded) forming a reliable index (α = .89).

Mediator. The modern racism scale (McConahay, 1986) adapted to the context of this study was used to measure out-group bias because its link to common group identity is well-established (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). The scale consisted of six items (e.g., “Over the past few years, Muslim immigrants have gotten more economically than they deserve”; α = .88), and responses were scored on 11-point scales with 1 (totally disagree) and 11 (totally agree) as endpoints.

Dependent outcomes. We used a short form of the majority integration efforts scale (Phelps et al., 2011) to measure support of societal efforts to integrate immigrants. Participants completed nine items of this scale, but because some of them could be confounded with multicultural ideology (e.g., “Norwegians should do more to get to know Muslim immigrants”), we focused on five items that explicitly dealt with concrete socio-political measures of integration: “Muslim immigrants should receive economic support to establish themselves in society.” “Laws and rules should be adjusted so that it is easier for Muslims to feel integrated in society.” “In order for Muslim immigrants to feel more welcome, the state should help pay for the construction of mosques, for example,” “If we are going to take integration seriously, we should accept that Norwegian culture changes,” “Political parties should have a quota for Muslim immigrants on their list of candidates so that they have a better opportunity to be elected” (α = .86).
Results

We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the mediational model. In the saturated model, common group identity predicted more support of integration efforts as well as less modern racism, which substantially mediated the effect on support of integration efforts (see Figure 1). Bootstrapping with 5,000 random resamples showed that the resulting indirect effect was significant ($\beta = .53$, $p < .001$, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [.43, .65]).

Preliminary Discussion

The results supported our first two hypotheses. As expected, the tendency to perceive Muslim immigrants and native-born Norwegians as belonging to the same group positively predicted integration efforts. This direct relation was strongly mediated by modern racism, as predicted. Thus, because common identifiers apply less of a group distinction between immigrants and themselves, they appear to also view them as deserving an equitable socio-economic status in society. This reduction in modern racism, in turn, makes them to become more supportive of integration efforts that may achieve this goal.

Although this study provided initial support for our hypotheses, it only measured theoretical support for integration efforts, leaving open whether the effects of common identity go beyond mere attitudinal support of immigrants. Next, we address this issue, testing whether the effects of common identities generalize to getting personally involved in face-to-face integration efforts.

Study 2

Here, we conceptually replicate the previous results by investigating whether common group identity also predicts whether, and for which period of time, majority members sign up volunteering in the Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Services (IRIS), teaching English language and American culture, and helping immigrants apply for jobs.

Method

Participants. A total of 146 Caucasian U.S. citizens ($M_{age} = 35.19$, $SD_{age} = 11.34$; males = 69.2%) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Procedure and materials

Independent variable. Participants indicated their agreement with the common group measure ($\alpha = .87$) from the previous study that was adapted to the present context.

Mediator. Participants completed the modern racism measure from Study 1 ($\alpha = .87$).

Dependent outcomes. In randomized order, participants responded to the support of integration efforts measure from the previous study ($\alpha = .85$) and indicated how many hours they would like to volunteer integrating newly arrived immigrants to the United States. Specifically, participants were informed about the IRIS and were asked how many hours they would like to volunteer in the NGO helping “searching for job openings, teaching of skills essential to life in the U.S. and explaining U.S. culture.” Participants who answered that they were willing to volunteer in the organization were asked to provide contact information in form of their email or MTurk worker id to receive further volunteering instructions. Crucially, all but 1 of the 75 participants who had indicated that they were willing to spend some time volunteering provided their contact details, underlining their behavioral commitment.

Results

Regression analyses showed that common group identity was related to more support of integration efforts ($\beta = .48$, $p < .001$), $F(1, 145) = 43.61$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .23$, to more hours that participants were willing to spend as volunteers ($\beta = .24$, $p = .003$), $F(1, 145) = 9.16$, $p = .003$, $R^2 = .06$, and to less out-group bias ($\beta = -.61$, $p < .001$), $F(1, 145) = 84.97$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .37$. Following the procedure of Study 1, we estimated an SEM model to test for mediation. In the unmediated saturated model, common group identity had a significant positive effect on both support of integration efforts and hours per week intended to volunteer (see Figure 2). When the mediator out-group bias (modern racism) was added next, the direct effect on support of integration efforts got weaker, indicating partial mediation, whereas the effect on hours volunteering got insignificant, indicating full mediation. Bootstrapping showed that common group identity had...
a positive indirect effect on both support of integration efforts ($\beta = .37, p < .001, 95\% CI = [.26, .49]$) and volunteering ($\beta = .17, p = .003, 95\% CI = [.07, .27]$), both mediated by modern racism.

**Preliminary Discussion**

This study conceptually replicated the effects of common identity on majority support for immigrant integration with a behavioral measure: Participants with high common group identity were more likely to support integration efforts as well as to volunteer helping integrating immigrants in a direct and personal way. As expected, this relation was again mediated by a decrease in modern racism. However, the study was based on correlational data, providing no causal evidence. The next study addresses this.

**Study 3**

Public discourse often frames immigration from a cost–benefit perspective, and reports show that immigrants’ benefit to society depends on their integration (Borjas, 1990; Vargas-Silva, 2013). Using an experimental manipulation of common versus separate group identity within an economic donation paradigm in a U.S. American setting, this study experimentally investigates whether common identity causes majority members to be more willing to pay for integrating immigrants. We used a saliency manipulation similar to previous studies (e.g., Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kunst & Thomsen, 2014; Kunst, Thomsen, & Sam, 2014; Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010) to experimentally alter the degree to which participants perceived American citizens and immigrants as belonging to a common group. Such manipulations increase the accessibility of mental constructs, with subsequent effects on causally related constructs (Schwartz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003). Specifically, we primed a common national identity with high permeability versus a separate type of national identity with low permeability. Here, we tested whether a common identity would cause majorities to donate more money from a surprise bonus to the immigrant-supporting organization, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

**Method**

**Participants.** In all, 102 Caucasian U.S. citizens ($M_{age} = 33.60, SD_{age} = 10.63$; females: $43.6\%$) were recruited through Amazon MTurk in November 2013.

**Procedure and materials**

**Experimental manipulation.** Participants were randomly assigned to a common group, separate group, or control condition. In the common group condition, participants indicated their agreement with eight statements depicting immigrants and U.S. citizens as one group by pronouncing their common fate and heritage (e.g., “Because we all are immigrants or descend directly from the people who time ago came to this country and built it, the United States of America and all its citizens are a true and proud product of immigration”). In the separate groups condition, participants responded to eight matched items displaying immigrants and U.S. citizens as two groups (e.g., “The fact that we descend directly from the people who time ago built this country makes us true and proud citizens of the United States of America”). In the control condition, participants responded to no items. Each condition was followed by a manipulation check (i.e., the common group measure adapted from Study 1; $\alpha = .93$). As for all measures, responses were rated on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) unless stated otherwise.

**Mediator.** Participants completed the modern racism out-group bias measure from the previous studies ($\alpha = .91$).
**Table 1.** Differences on the Main Study Variables Between the Experimental Conditions in Study 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common group</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Separate groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation check</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>4.60a</td>
<td>4.69b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-group bias</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.43c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration efforts</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>3.48d</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU donations</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>4.03a</td>
<td>2.26d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** ACLU donations represent U.S. cents. ACLU = American Civil Liberties Union.

ANOVA F statistics: \( F(2, 98) = 3.63, p = .030 \); \( F(2, 98) = 3.19, p = .056 \); \( F(2, 98) = 3.11, p = .049 \); \( F(2, 98) = 6.74, p = .002 \).

Significant planned contrasts with common group condition: \( t(98) = 2.49, p = .014, \eta^2 = .08 \); \( t(98) = 2.13, p = .036, \eta^2 = .07 \); \( t(98) = 2.43, p = .017, \eta^2 = .08 \); \( t(98) = 2.45, p = .016, \eta^2 = .08 \); \( t(98) = 2.71, p = .008, \eta^2 = .10 \); \( t(98) = −3.45, p = .001, \eta^2 = .16 \).

**Dependent outcomes.** In randomized order, participants completed the support of integration efforts scale from Study 1 (\( \alpha = .85 \)) and a donation task. Here, participants were told about the ACLU as an organization dedicated to help integrating immigrants. They then received a surprise bonus of 40 cents and were asked whether they would like to donate a part of it to the ACLU. Participants could indicate any amount between 0 (no donation) and 40 cents (full donation) on a 9-point ratio scale with 5 cents units. It is important to note that, although 40 cents may seem as a minuscule sum at first sight, it constitutes a significant improvement of MTurk workers’ hourly wage doubling it from US$4/hr to US$9.3/hr. Hence, donating parts of the bonus can be regarded as costly integration effort for the participants.

**Results**

After excluding one outlier using the interquartile method (see Rousseeuw & Croux, 1993), the experimental conditions differed on the manipulation check\(^2\) (see Table 1 for all means and test statistics). Simple contrasts revealed that individuals in the common group condition displayed stronger common group identity than participants in the control group and in the separate group condition. ANOVAs for the mediator and outcome variables were also significant and produced a similar pattern of results. For the mediator modern racism, participants in the common group condition were less biased than those in the separate group condition, whereas the control group differed neither from the common group (\( p = .180 \)) nor from the separate group (\( p = .255 \)). In terms of support of integration efforts, participants in the common group condition showed more integration support than those in the control condition, but did not differ significantly from those in the separate group condition (\( p = .108 \)). The separate group and control group also did not differ from each other here (\( p = .479 \)).

Crucially, participants in the common group condition donated significantly more money to ACLU than those in the control condition and separate group condition. Again, the separate and control groups did not differ from each other on this variable (\( p = .200 \)).

Finally, we compared the common group condition with the merged control and separate group conditions, as these had not differed significantly from each other on the manipulation check or the other variables (possibly because seeing both groups as separate constitutes the social default). Here, participants in the common group condition showed less modern racist out-group bias, \( t(99) = 2.18, p = .032, \eta^2 = .05 \); showed more support of integration efforts, \( t(99) = −2.39, p = .019, \eta^2 = .05 \); and donated more money to ACLU, \( t(99) = −2.90, p = .006, \eta^2 = .08 \), than those in the combined control and separate group conditions.

As modern racist out-group bias was negatively related to both support of integration efforts, \( r(101) = −.65, p < .001 \), and the donation variable, \( r(101) = −.27, p = .007 \), SEM was used to test whether it mediated the experimental effects of common group identity. Specifically, in the first step, an unmediated model was estimated with an experimental dummy variable (0 = control and separate group condition, 1 = common group condition) as predictor and donations and support of integration efforts as outcome variables. In the model, \( \chi^2(1, N = 101) = .45, p = .503, \text{RMSEA} < .001, \text{CFI} = 1.00 \) (see Figure 3), the experimental dummy variable positively predicted both outcome variables. When the out-group bias measure was added as mediator to the model, \( \chi^2(1, N = 101) = 1.05, p = .307, \text{RMSEA} = .021, \text{CFI} = .999 \), the direct effect of the experimental dummy variable on support of integration efforts became insignificant indicating full mediation, whereas the effect on donations became slightly smaller indicating partial mediation. Importantly, bootstrapping showed that the indirect effect both on support of integration efforts (\( \beta = .14, p = .019, 95\% \text{CI} = [.03, .26] \)) and on donations (\( \beta = .04, p = .018, 95\% \text{CI} = [.01, .11] \)) was significant.

**Preliminary Discussion**

The results of this third study supported our hypotheses: Experimentally recategorizing participants into a common group translated not only into more support of integration efforts but also into behavioral efforts to integrate immigrants in form of monetary donations to ACLU. As in
the previous study, both of these effects were mediated by a decrease in out-group bias.

**Study 4**

Although providing consistent results, so far all studies only investigated the effects of common group categorizations—a categorization arguably preferred by majority members because it resembles assimilation and color-blindness in which the majority culture holds primacy of definition (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio et al., 2007; Dovidio et al., 2012; Hehman et al., 2012). However, minority members generally prefer dual identities, which allow them to keep their heritage identity while being part of the larger society. Thus, it is important to test whether dual categorization may evoke a similar behavioral engagement among majority members as common group categorizations do. Hence, the present study predicts and tests that common group categorizations result in more behavioral efforts among majorities than dual categorizations do as it is the categorization preferred by majority members.

Second, although we have shown that a decrease in modern racism mediated the effects of common group identity on integration efforts across three studies, the strength of this mediation varied. Hence, it is possible that other mediators are at play. Two such mediators that may be central here are color-blindness and acculturation expectations: Given the notion that common identities may evoke color-blindness, these color-blind perceptions may lead to neglect of the challenges immigrants go through due to their immigration backgrounds (see Banfield & Dovidio, 2013). Hence, it is possible that another effect of common group categorization is that it makes majority members treat immigrants color-blindly (see Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio et al., 2012). Moreover, acculturation expectations (commonly used to investigate majority members’ stance toward immigrants) may also play a role for majority members’ actual behavioral integration efforts and possibly mediate the relations of interest. If common groups for majority members indeed involve assimilationism, this should also imply more individualism and less integrationism, resulting in indirect negative effects of common group categorization on integration efforts. Moreover, because common groups involve granting immigrants membership in the majority group, they should lead to less exclusionism and segregationism, which may produce positive indirect effects on integration efforts.

The present study addresses this experimentally. Because the experimental manipulations in Study 2 can be criticized for not only priming common or separate group categorization but also positivity or negativity toward immigrants, we adopted an alternative recategorization manipulation by Banfield and Dovidio (2013). Here, in a common, dual, or separate group condition, participants were asked to read an excerpt from a “psychology article” that sought to hold positive valence constant across conditions (i.e., the separate group condition emphasized that we should “celebrate distinct identities,” not unlike multiculturalism, rather than the exclusion of immigrants that “are not American” from the common group). We tested whether common, dual, or separate group categorizations would cause majorities to support integration efforts in theory, sign up for volunteering, and donate more money to ACLU using all dependent variables from the previous studies.

**Method**

**Participants.** A sample of 215 Caucasian American participants who passed an attention check (Oppenheimer,
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) was collected through MTurk ($M_{age} = 36.70, SD_{age} = 11.67$; females: 35.3%).

**Procedure and materials**

**Experimental manipulation.** In the common group condition, participants read the summary of a “psychology article” that emphasized the importance of a common American identity (e.g., “Instead of focusing on our particular ethnicity/culture, we should celebrate that we all belong to the same big whole.”). In the dual group condition, the summary emphasized the importance of identifying with a superordinate group and ethnic or cultural sub-group (e.g., “We can allow each group to stress its unique identity as well as the American aspects of its identity.”). In the separate group condition, participants read a summary emphasizing the importance of identifying with one’s ethnic or cultural identity (e.g., “We should celebrate the identities of the different groups that comprise America”; see the online appendix for the full texts). Last, in the control group, no text was presented. Following the exact experimental procedure of Banfield and Dovidio (2013), we did not include a manipulation check after this categorization manipulation because it might have interrupted or interfered with downstream experimental effects.

**Mediators.** Participants in randomized order completed the following mediators in addition to the out-group bias measure from the previous studies ($\alpha = .92$) rated on Likert-type 7-point scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree):

**Acculturation expectations.** Using the Host Community Acculturation Scale (Bourhis & Montreuil, 2013; Safdar, Dupuis, Lewis, El-Geledi, & Bourhis, 2008), we asked participants to indicate their support of the four classic acculturation expectations coined by Berry (1974, 1980): assimilationism (e.g., “Immigrants should give up their culture of origin for the sake of adopting American culture”), exclusionism (e.g., “Immigrants should maintain their culture of origin, nor adopt American culture, because, in any case, there should be less immigration to the US”), segregationism (e.g., “Immigrants can maintain their culture of origin as long as they do not mix it with American culture”), and integrationism (e.g., “Immigrants should maintain their own heritage culture while also adopting American culture”). Moreover participants indicated their support for the two expectations, individualism (e.g., “Whether immigrants maintain their cultural heritage or adopt American culture makes no difference because each person is free to adopt the culture of their choice”) and integration–transformationism (e.g., “Americans should transform certain aspects of their culture of origin in order to really integrate the culture of immigrants”), as recently coined by Bourhis, Montreuil, Barrette, and Montaruli (2009). Each acculturation expectation was measured in the four domains of culture, values, customs, and marriage, and formed a reliable index (assimilationism: $\alpha = .87$; segregationism: $\alpha = .85$; exclusionism: $\alpha = .92$; integrationism: $\alpha = .81$; individualism: $\alpha = .86$; integration–transformationism: $\alpha = .79$).

**Color-blindness.** A six-item measure (e.g., “It’s important to recognize that people are basically the same regardless of their ethnicity”) adopted from Levin et al. (2012) was used to measure participants’ endorsement of color-blindness ($\alpha = .88$).

**Dependent outcomes.** Participants in randomized order completed the integration efforts measure from the previous studies ($\alpha = .87$, took part in an ACLU donation task as in Study 2, and indicated how many hours they would be willing to volunteer mentoring an immigrant youth through the organization MENTOR “providing structure and supervision and serving as important bridges to their new cultures.”

**Results**

Before testing our mediational model, we conducted a MANOVA with the mediators and outcome variables as dependent variables and experimental condition as between-subject variable. Here, a general effect of experimental condition on the variables was observed (Roy’s Largest Root = .10), $F(11, 204) = 1.98$, $p = .032$. Next, we ran planned contrasts to test whether participants in the common group categorized, compared with those in the control condition, showed less out-group bias (as in the previous studies), possibly more color-blindness, and whether they differed on the six acculturation expectations. Indeed, participants in the common group condition were less biased toward the out-group and showed less unwelcoming acculturation expectations such as segregationism and exclusionism (see Table 2). Conversely, they showed higher degrees of the welcoming acculturation expectations integrationism and individualism and donated more money, although the latter effect was only marginally significant. A slight trend of increased color-blindness was also observed, but this effect was also only marginally significant ($p = .090$; see Table 2).

Also compared with dual identity, which did not differ from the control condition on any variable ($258 < ps < .924$), participants in the common group condition displayed less exclusionism, displayed more integrationism, were less biased, marginally significantly reported more individualism, and donated more money (see Table 2). Surprisingly, however, compared with the separate group condition, participants in the common group condition differed only by showing marginally significantly more color-blindness. Participants in the separate group condition further displayed less segregationism ($\Delta M = -.50, p = .037, 95\% CI = [-.97, -.03]$) and more individualism ($\Delta M = .60, p = .014, 95\% CI = [.12, 1.08]$) compared with the control group, but did not differ from participants in the dual group condition on any variable ($100 < ps < .881$).
Despite these unexpected separate group effects, common group categorization had predicted effects on the mediators when compared with control, and these mediators were consistently related to the outcome variables (see Table 3). Consequently, we set out to test our mediation models comparing the common group categorization with control (0 = control, 1 = common group). Before testing this model, the donation variable was recoded (0 = no donation, 1 = donation) because it was substantially skewed (skewness = 2.25). As only one marginal direct effect of common group categorization on the integration efforts variables presented at the very end of the survey was observed, we estimated a model where the affected mediators (i.e., modern racism, segregationism, integrationism, exclusionism, and individualism) fully mediated the effects of common group categorization on these efforts.

In accordance with the MANOVA results, regression analyses showed that common group categorization led to less exclusionism ($\beta = -.18, p = .048$), $F(1, 118) = 4.01, p = .048$; segregationism ($\beta = -.21, p = .021$), $F(1, 118) = 5.51, p = .021$; and out-group bias ($\beta = -.19, p = .034$), $F(1, 118) = 4.59, p = .034$. Conversely, it led to more integrationism ($\beta = .23, p = .012$), $F(1, 118) = 6.49, p = .012$, and individualism ($\beta = .25, p = .006$), $F(1, 118) = 7.86, p = .006$ (see Figure 4 for coefficients in a model including all mediators).

Having established the first link of the model, we ran regression models to test the extent to which these mediators, in turn, would predict the different types of integration efforts. In a linear regression model with support of integration efforts as dependent variable, $F(5, 113) = 18.04, p < .001, R^2 = .44$, modern racism once more turned out as the only significant predictor ($\beta = -.75, p < .001$), while all other mediators remained insignificant ($1.79 < ps < .362$). Bootstrapping using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) showed that the resulting indirect and positive effect was significant, $B = .39, SE = .18, 95\% CI = [.04, .77]$.

### Table 2. Differences on the Main Variables Between the Experimental Conditions in Study 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Common group</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Dual groups</th>
<th>Separate groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilationism</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregationism</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>3.17$^a$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionism</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.72$^b$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrationism</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>5.11$^d$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>5.01$^f$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration–transformationism</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color-blindness</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>5.47$^g$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-group bias</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>3.31$^h$</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Integration Efforts</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Donated</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>3.51$^i$</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Planned to Volunteer</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Marginal means are displayed. Planned contrast with common group condition: $^a\Delta M = -.52, p = .026, 95\% CI = [-.98, -.06]$; $^b\Delta M = -.49, p = .068, 95\% CI = [-1.01, -.04]$; $^c\Delta M = -.56, p = .053, 95\% CI = [-1.12, .01]$; $^d\Delta M = .48, p = .021, 95\% CI = [.07, .88]$; $^e\Delta M = .52, p = .018, 95\% CI = [0.09, .96]$; $^f\Delta M = .63, p = .009, 95\% CI = [.17, 1.10]$; $^g\Delta M = .46, p = .075, 95\% CI = [.05, .96]$; $^h\Delta M = .34, p = .090, 95\% CI = [-.05, .74]$; $^i\Delta M = .40, p = .075, 95\% CI = [0.4, .84]$; $^j\Delta M = -.58, p = .041, 95\% CI = [-1.13, -.02]$; $^k\Delta M = -.65, p = .031, 95\% CI = [-1.25, -.06]$; $^l\Delta M = -.58, p = .041, 95\% CI = [-1.13, -.02]$; $^m\Delta M = 3.38, p = .065, 95\% CI = [25, 7.02]$.

### Table 3. Correlations Between Main Variables in Study 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilationism</td>
<td>.74$^{***}$</td>
<td>.69$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.43$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.63$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.26$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.24$^{***}$</td>
<td>.70$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.44$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.27$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregationism</td>
<td>.70$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.34$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.58$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.20$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.38$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.67$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.41$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.29$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionism</td>
<td>-.45$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.54$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.32$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.37$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.73$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.46$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.26$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.15$^{*}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrationism</td>
<td>.45$^{***}$</td>
<td>.26$^{***}$</td>
<td>.45$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.32$^{***}$</td>
<td>.20$^{***}$</td>
<td>.16$^{*}$</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>.38$^{***}$</td>
<td>.41$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.55$^{***}$</td>
<td>.39$^{***}$</td>
<td>.22$^{*}$</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration–transformationism</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.44$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.60$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color-blindness</td>
<td>-.28$^{***}$</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.15$^{*}$</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-group bias</td>
<td>-.70$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.29$^{***}$</td>
<td>-.18$^{**}$</td>
<td>.29$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of integration</td>
<td>.32$^{***}$</td>
<td>.29$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.29$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.25$^{***}$</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
For donation as dependent variable, a logistic regression, Hosmer–Lemeshow $\chi^2(5, N = 119) = 8.70, p = .122$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .10$, showed that only modern racism emerged as significant and negative predictor (see Figure 4), whereas all the other variables remained insignificant ($0.297 < p < 0.943$). Bootstrapping of the resulting indirect effect showed that common group categorization indirectly and positively predicted donation, mediated by modern racism, $B = .34, SE = .25, 95\% CI = [0.01, 0.96]$.

Last, for mentoring as dependent variable, $F(5, 113) = 2.36, p = .045, R^2 = .10$, the mediator modern racism negatively predicted the hours participants were willing to volunteer ($\beta = −.32, p = .029$), whereas segregationism ($\beta = .36, p = .006$) surprisingly emerged as positive predictor. Bootstrapping indicated that the resulting indirect effects (as mediated by modern racism, $B = .72, SE = .45, 95\% CI = [0.10, 1.97]$, and segregationism, $B = −.86, SE = .52, 95\% CI = [−2.33, −.13]$) were significant.

**Preliminary Discussion**

Of the different categorizations, common group categorization (and not dual categorization) affected most mediators, in line with majority members’ general affinity for them (Dovidio et al., 2007). Of these mediators, out-group bias measured as modern racism most consistently predicted integration efforts and, hence, mediated the indirect effects. Common categorization, encapsulating majorities as well as minorities, lets majority members define the premises of integration and ultimately strengthens their own group. This may explain why it causes majority members to help immigrants get comparable socio-economic status rather than dual categorizations.

Interestingly, common group categorization was unrelated to assimilationism. On the contrary, in the common group condition, participants showed heightened degrees of integrationism, which in fact encourages immigrants to maintain their heritage culture. Nevertheless, there was a weak tendency of common group categorization leading to more color-blindness, but this effect did not reach two-tailed significance.

Unexpectedly, the assimilationism measure was weakly and negatively related to color-blindness. To the best of our knowledge, color-blindness and the acculturation expectation of assimilationism have not been assessed together in previous studies, possibly because they have been seen as equivalent. The fact that these constructs differentially related to other attitudinal and behavioral measures in this study suggests that both measures should be treated as independent constructs in future research.

Although the common group categorization produced expected results compared with the control condition, it differed only slightly from the separate group condition. This finding seems inconsistent with the previous studies, but may be explained by the fact that the text in the separate group condition of Banfield and Dovidio’s (2013) manipulation praised the positive aspects of celebrating ones ethnic identity. Hence, it may have resembled a major aspect of multiculturalism (i.e., “Recognizing that all of us are members of ethnic or cultural groups that have different traditions can contribute to making America a better nation”), rather than emphasizing separate group categorization in its original sense (i.e., “Americans and immigrants represent two different groups.”).

Strikingly, the different acculturation expectations that are frequently used to assess the majority side in the process
of acculturation were virtually unrelated to actual integration efforts in our model. Hence, it seems as if these expectations are of little importance for how majority members behave toward immigrants. Yet, unexpectedly, the acculturation expectation of segregationism was positively related to willingness to mentor an immigrant youth. This finding is puzzling, because segregationism represents the expectation that immigrants (a) should keep their own culture, (b) but only as long as they do not mix it with the majority culture. Yet, looking at the correlation matrix (see Table 3), a suppressor effect seems to explain this finding, with segregationism switching from being unrelated to positively predicting mentoring once the other mediators were controlled for. Hence, controlling for out-group bias variables such as modern racism, the unique variance of segregationism may primarily have dealt with the first aspect, namely, support of cultural maintenance, explaining why the variable turned out positively predicting volunteering.

**Study 5**

So far, we have found consistent support for the notion that common group identities motivate integration efforts by reducing negative bias in form of modern racism. In the previous study, modern racism even mediated the effects over and above color-blindness and a full range of acculturation expectations. Here, we set out to conceptually replicate the key finding that common identities, but not dual identities, result in more altruistic behavior toward immigrants, using a one-shot dictator game. To exclude as many other potential factors from reducing negative bias in form of modern racism, in the previous implementation of a one-shot dictator game where responses were rated on a sliding response scale with cents as units: “Immigrants can face difficult financial situations when arriving to a new country. We give you a bonus of $1. How much of this bonus would you like to give to the next immigrant taking this survey?” The game was played with a forced exit, so that the “immigrant recipient” would never know that the game was being played.

**Method**

**Participants.** A total of 151 U.S. citizens (M\_\_age = 32.64, SD\_\_age = 10.18; females: 41.7%) were recruited using the same procedure as in the previous three studies.

**Procedure and materials**

**Independent variables.** Participants responded to six items, of which three assessed their dual identity (e.g., “For me, immigrants are Americans like all of us but also members of specific immigrant groups”; α = .93). Both measures were unrelated (r = .09, p = .251).

**Mediators.** Participants completed the out-group bias measure (α = .89) and the color-blindness measure (α = .88) from the previous study.

**Dependent outcomes.** In randomized order, participants indicated their support of integration efforts on the scale used in the previous studies (α = .79) and took part in the following implementation of a one-shot dictator game where responses were rated on a sliding response scale with cents as units: “Immigrants can face difficult financial situations when arriving to a new country. We give you a bonus of $1. How much of this bonus would you like to give to the next immigrant taking this survey?” The game was played with a forced exit, so that the “immigrant recipient” would never know that the game was being played.

**Results**

As displayed in Table 4, common identity, but not dual identity, was related to more support of integration efforts and more money shared in the dictator game. Moreover, common identity predicted less out-group bias and more color-blindness as in the previous study. As each of these mediators, in turn, predicted at least one type of integration effort, we estimated a SEM model as in Study 3, with the difference that both dual and common identities were predictors.

In the unmediated, saturated model, only common identity had a significant effect on support of integration efforts (β = .52, p < .001) and money shared in the dictator game (β = .18, p = .025), whereas dual identity had no effect on either variable (support of integration efforts: β = .13, p = .182; dictator game: β = .09, p = .102). Next, we estimated a model where out-group bias and color-blindness were added as mediators and dual identification was controlled for, and deleted insignificant paths. In the final fitted model, χ^2(6, N = 151) = 3.22, p = .781, RMSEA < .001, CFI = 1.00 (see Figure 5), bootstrapping showed that out-group bias mediated the positive and indirect effects of common group identity on support of integration efforts (β = .25, p < .001, 95% CI = [.15, .37]) and money shared in the
dictator game ($\beta = .15, p = .011, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.03, .29]$). One opposite indirect effect was observed with color-blindness as mediator. Here, common group identity indirectly led to slightly lower levels of integration efforts ($\beta = -.07, p = .027, 95\% \text{ CI} = [-.15, -.01]$). However, despite these asymmetric indirect effects, the total indirect effect of common identity on support of integration efforts was still positive and significant ($\beta = .18, p = .002, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.07, .31]$).

**Preliminary Discussion**

Analogous to the previous study, common group identity predicted integration efforts, whereas dual identity had no effect. Common identity, however, had two asymmetric effects on support of integration efforts: Although it indirectly led to more support of integration efforts and money shared in the dictator game as mediated by a decrease in modern racism, it also indirectly lead to less support of integration efforts as mediated by an increase in color-blindness. Nevertheless, the total net effect of these two divergent mediations was positive and highly significant, indicating that a decrease in modern racism remained the dominant underlying process.

**General Discussion**

In five studies, we have shown that common group identity positively predicts majority members’ efforts to integrate immigrants. This was the case for mere support of economic, political, and juridical measures, but also for actual behavior such as monetary donations to, and even personal volunteering in, immigrant-supporting organizations. In each study, a reduction of out-group bias—and in particular, modern racism—mediated this relationship between common group identity and integration efforts.

Common group identities are well-known for reducing racist beliefs (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, et al., 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). However, the reason for why modern racism so consistently mediated effects on integration efforts in our studies may be that it assesses not only out-group negativity but also the perception that minority members have received more resources than they deserve (Sears & Henry, 2005). Hence, it appears that common groups increase integration efforts primarily because they promote a generalized norm of resource sharing within the common in-group (encapsulating majority members and immigrants), which effectively counters such resource-distribution bias between majorities and immigrants (also see Brewer, 2008).

Strikingly, acculturation expectations played virtually no role for majority members’ actual integration efforts. That is, even expectations such as integrationism did not appear to affect the degree to which majority members were involved in immigrants’ integration. The reason for this finding may be that integration as acculturation expectation deals with immigrants’ culture, whereas integration efforts as conceptualized in this research dealt with immigrants’ socio-structural position in society. Given that we included acculturation expectations only in one study, we think that it is vital for
future research to follow up on this surprising finding. More generally, this research emphasizes the need to distinguish between integration as acculturation strategy and integration as socio-economic state, and also to look at acculturation phenomena from a common in-group identity perspective.

It also has to be noted that, although modern racism mediated the relations in each study, some variation in the strength of mediation was observed: Modern racism fully mediated the relationship between common identity and behavioral integration efforts in each but one study. However, although it partially mediated the relationship between common identity and support of integration efforts in the cross-sectional studies, it fully mediated this relationship in the experimental studies. This may be due to the fact that priming common identity had weaker effects on attitudinal support of integration efforts than a trait-level attitudinal measure of common identity to begin with (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Moreover, the smaller sample sizes in the experimental studies (i.e., dummy comparing two conditions in a mediation model) may have made it harder to observe the direct effect at high levels of significance. This, in turn, increases the likelihood to observe full mediation when mediators are added to a model (Rucker et al., 2011). Obviously, other potential mediators might also be at play in the partial mediations and could be followed up in future research. Nevertheless, the broad range of alternative mediators that we considered suggests that modern racism indeed is a central mediator of the effect of common identity on efforts to socio-economically integrate immigrants.

Common group identifications in multicultural contexts are not free of pitfalls: They can inflate low-status group members’ perception of societal equality with consequent negative effects on social action (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; also see Wright & Baray, 2012 for a discussion) and may increase color-blindness (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). Indeed, the last study showed that such an increase in color-blindness may also somewhat weaken the effects of common group identity on integration efforts. Research suggests that a group commonality focus may serve a color-blind and, hence, status-reinforcing function especially for majority members who perceive their advantaged status position as illegitimate and unstable (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). However, the fact that the status asymmetry between citizens and newly arrived immigrants can be seen as relatively stable may explain the rather weak effects of common group identity on color-blindness in the context of the present research.

Moreover, the fact that only common identity, but not dual identity, increased integration efforts indicates that common group identifiers’ willingness to invest in the integration of immigrants is not solely driven by selfless motives. That is, their willingness may also hinge on integrating immigrants into a group mainly defined on the majority’s premises, which ultimately means investing in their own (expanded) group. Also, because common groups do not allow minority groups to maintain their own heritage identity within the superordinate group to the same degree as dual groups do, they may clash with immigrants’ bicultural identity concepts (Dovidio et al., 2007). Nevertheless, common group identity among majority members consistently increased social action favoring minority groups (whereas dual identities had no such effect), was unrelated to assimilationism, and only slightly increased color-blindness. Hence, common groups appear useful for making majority groups accept immigrants as worthy members of their group and to help them obtain full or equal socio-economic status as group members.6

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was supported by (a) Young Research Leader awards from the Danish and Norwegian Councils for Independent Research granted to the second author (b) Fulbright Scholarship granted to the first author, and (c) doctoral research funds from the Department of Psychology/University of Oslo granted to the first author.

Notes

1. As the constructs of interest can be seen as conceptually related, it was important to establish that they tapped unique constructs. To conduct an appropriately powered factor analysis, we pooled the Americans samples from Studies 2 and 3 and an additional data set for this purpose. In a factor analysis with this merged sample, three factors were extracted and rotated using oblique rotation, resulting in a parsimonious three-factor structure without any crossloadings. In this rotated solution, all modern racism items loaded on the first (eigenvalue = 5.98), common group items on the second (eigenvalue = 1.56), and all integration effort items on the third factor (eigenvalue = 1.00).

2. On average, participants agreed with both the common group members’ perception of societal equality with consequent negative effects on social action (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; also see Wright & Baray, 2012 for a discussion) and may increase color-blindness (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). Indeed, the last study showed that such an increase in color-blindness may also somewhat weaken the effects of common group identity on integration efforts. Research suggests that a group commonality focus may serve a color-blind and, hence, status-reinforcing function especially for majority members who perceive their advantaged status position as illegitimate and unstable (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). However, the fact that the status asymmetry between citizens and newly arrived immigrants can be seen as relatively stable may explain the rather weak effects of common group identity on color-blindness in the context of the present research.

Moreover, the fact that only common identity, but not dual identity, increased integration efforts indicates that common group identifiers’ willingness to invest in the integration of immigrants is not solely driven by selfless motives. That is, their willingness may also hinge on integrating immigrants into a group mainly defined on the majority’s premises, which ultimately means investing in their own (expanded) group. Also, because common groups do not allow minority groups to maintain their own heritage identity within the superordinate group to the same degree as dual groups do, they may clash with immigrants’ bicultural identity concepts (Dovidio et al., 2007). Nevertheless, common group identity among majority members consistently increased social action favoring minority groups (whereas dual identities had no such effect), was unrelated to assimilationism, and only slightly increased color-blindness. Hence, common groups appear useful for making majority groups accept immigrants as worthy members of their group and to help them obtain full or equal socio-economic status as group members.6

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was supported by (a) Young Research Leader awards from the Danish and Norwegian Councils for Independent Research granted to the second author (b) Fulbright Scholarship granted to the first author, and (c) doctoral research funds from the Department of Psychology/University of Oslo granted to the first author.

Notes

1. As the constructs of interest can be seen as conceptually related, it was important to establish that they tapped unique constructs. To conduct an appropriately powered factor analysis, we pooled the Americans samples from Studies 2 and 3 and an additional data set for this purpose. In a factor analysis with this merged sample, three factors were extracted and rotated using oblique rotation, resulting in a parsimonious three-factor structure without any crossloadings. In this rotated solution, all modern racism items loaded on the first (eigenvalue = 5.98), common group items on the second (eigenvalue = 1.56), and all integration effort items on the third factor (eigenvalue = 1.00).

2. On average, participants agreed with both the common group (M = 5.77, SD = .77) and separate group items (M = 4.77, SD = 1.35), suggesting experimental assimilation effects in both conditions.

3. We thank Dr. Jillian Banfield for sending us these experimental materials.

4. Testing how much time was needed to read the different excerpts (each > 200 words) suggested that a minimum of 40 s would be needed for a fast reader to read the texts. Participants who spent less than this time were excluded as they were highly likely to have skipped the full or parts of the reading task. In total, 35 participants (14%) of initially 250 participants were excluded as they did not meet this criterion.

5. We thank Dr. Saba Safdar for sending us a version of the scale.

6. We thank both reviewers and Editor Dr. Incheol Choi for their valuable advice and suggestions that helped improving this article substantially.

Supplemental Material

The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb.sagepub.com/supplemental.
References


Galabuzi, G.-E. (2004). Racializing the division of labour: Neoliberal restructuring and economic segregation of Canada’s racialized groups. In J. Stanford & L. F. Vosko (Eds.), *Challenging the*
market: The struggle to regulate work and income (pp. 175-204). Montreal, Québec, Canada: McGill-Queen’s Press.


